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1. INTRODUCTION 
Discussions about climate change have undergone a subtle but critical change in 
language. Today one speaks of “mitigation” of climate change and of “adaptation 
to the effects” of climate change.1 These terms imply that climate change is no 
longer something that can be entirely avoided or prevented; the choices now are 
about reducing the extent of possible damages and adjusting to the damages 
already likely to occur whatever future reductions in climate change occur. 
While no part of the earth will escape the effects of climate change, the 
world’s oceans and coasts present a unique set of challenges. Most of the heat 
generated by climate change is absorbed by the oceans, partly because the oceans 
cover three quarters of the planet, and partly because of water’s capacity to absorb 
and hold heat. Warming oceans will expand and may erase major areas of the 
world’s shorelines. Warmer oceans will redistribute fish species, which will 
impact industries and communities, to which will be added the effects of 
fundamental changes in ocean chemistry as seawater absorbs more and more 
carbon. (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2014)  
Adaptation to the effects of climate change has emerged as a major issue for 
those addressing issues related to oceans and coasts, and many of the questions 
being examined are economic. Attention to sea level rise is frequently spurred by 
depictions of the millions or billions of dollars of property and infrastructure at 
risk. Those engaged in developing adaptation strategies confront questions of how 
to deploy limited resources for adaptation in the context of deep uncertainty about 
when and to what extent adaptation will be needed.  
There are many studies of the economic effects of climate change. Examples 
in the U.S. include studies sponsored by the public sector (Melillo, Richmond, 
and Yohe 2014) and the private sector (Gordon 2014) But there have been few 
reviews of the economics of adaptation. Kahn undertakes such a review including 
                                                        
1 There is a significant amount of linguistic confusion in the literature about the terms 
mitigation and adaptation. “Mitigation” is a term that has long been used in the literature 
on natural hazards such as flooding and earthquakes to refer to steps meant to reduce 
damages from these hazards. In this meaning, “mitigation” and “adaptation” are 
functionally equivalent. In the climate change literature, “mitigation” is most commonly 
used to refer to steps, such as use of renewable energy sources, which reduce the extent 
of climate change. “Adaptation” refers to steps to reduce damages or to reorganize 
economic activities to adjust to the consequences of climate change, such as shifting 
fishing effort between species. 
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discussions of climate effects on agriculture and food prices as well as individual 
adaptation to periods of excessive heat. (Kahn 2016) His review does include a 
discussion of sea level rise but in the larger context of how individuals and 
organizations will assess the risks of damage to their property, and how this will 
shape their decisions to invest in shoreline property. He points out that because 
both the timing and magnitude of risk are unknown, it is difficult to apply 
standard economic models to these cases. He identifies alternate models that 
might be used for investment decisions, without concluding which is most 
appropriate.  
There are many coastal areas that are already explicitly developing adaptation 
strategies. In the United States, areas such as Miami, Florida (Wdowinski et al. 
2016) and the lower Chesapeake Bay (Eggleston and Pope 2013) are already 
dealing with sea level rise effects and trying to find cost effective solutions to a 
crisis that is already happening. In the northeastern United States where Hurricane 
Sandy struck in 2012, significant public and private resources are being devoted 
to developing plans to deal with the recurrence of such storms. California has 
already issued guidance to communities for sea level rise planning, with a focus 
on land use. (California Coastal Commission 2015) In Europe, where dealing with 
climate change issues does not confront the peculiar politics at work in the United 
States, adaptation to sea level rise is well underway. (Tol, Klein, and Nicholls 
2008; Hinkel et al. 2010) 
At the same time, there are numerous low-lying coastal areas where 
adaptation is not a question of rebuilding existing structures or building protective 
barriers but the continued existence of shore land suitable for habitation. This is 
already a well-known problem in small island nations in the Indian Ocean (The 
Seychelles National Climate Change Committee 2009) and the Pacific (Ives 
2016), but it is also an imminent problem for communities in Alaska (Mooney 
2015) and Louisiana (Beller and Charles 2016). Adaptation that requires complete 
retreat from islands and shore lines is no longer a theoretical possibility but must 
be actively factored into the options of many areas if not for immediate action 
than very possibly within the lifetime of current residents of such areas. 
These examples indicate that sea level rise and its effects are not a matter of 
the distant future. Most places are not yet seeing these effects. Nonetheless, 
decisions are being made throughout the world about where and what to build, 
rebuild or expand in coastal areas. New residential and commercial development 
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is going in to places that will, well within the economic life of the structures, be 
subject to recurrent flooding from storms and/or constant “nuisance flooding” 
with daily tidal shifts. Infrastructure, including roads, energy facilities, water and 
sewer facilities along with other critical infrastructure such as hospitals, are also 
being built or rebuilt with little regard to the threats from sea level rise. 
Adaptation is an issue for today, whatever the climate and sea level rise models 
say about changes over this century. 
There is, therefore, some urgency in finding ways to deploy limited 
resources in the most effective manner possible. In this paper, I 
review the current state of the application of economics to the 
formulation of adaptation strategies for oceans and coasts with 
focusing on four questions: 
 How can economics help confront the profound uncertainty 
that shapes all decisions regarding climate change? This is a 
particularly critical issue because the dominant use of economics 
in adaptation thinking will likely be benefit-cost analysis, which, in 
its standard form assumes certain characteristics of the future 
which simply will not hold in a world with a nonstationary climate. 
 How should adaptation be paid for? This would seem at first 
glance to be a question for much more advanced stages of planning 
once options are identified and evaluated. But the willingness of 
decision makers to undertake actions that could be very costly in 
the near term relative to highly uncertain benefits in the distant 
future will largely depend on an acceptance that resources for 
adaptation can be found. An understanding of the rapidly evolving 
landscape of adaptation finance and its possibilities will be an 
important catalyst for action. 
 What are the socioeconomic values at risk from climate 
change? To date, most socioeconomic studies designed to spur 
adaptive actions have focused on likely damages to property. But 
economic vulnerability extends well beyond the loss of individual 
buildings to the entire functioning of local and regional economies 
and these effects have barely been considered. 
 Can market mechanisms be used to make adaptation more 
efficient? Market based tools such as carbon taxes or cap and trade 
3
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emissions regulations have become the most commonly suggested 
and used approaches to encouraging emissions reductions. Is there 
a similar role for market-based approaches to choosing adaptation 
strategies? 
 
2. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO COASTAL ADAPTATION 
While “mitigation” of climate change through reduction in greenhouse gas 
emissions is relatively straightforward as to the objective, if not the means, 
“adaptation” is a more complex concept. This widely cited definition leaves a 
great many questions unanswered: To what changes are we supposed to adapt?  
How big will those changes be?  When will they occur?   What responses should 
be considered?  On what basis will we chose the response?  Where will the 
resources to respond be found?  
The IPCC defines adaptation as “adjustments in natural or human systems in 
response to actual or expected climate stimuli or their effects, which moderates 
harm or exploits beneficial opportunities”.  (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change 2008) This definition clearly does not supply all the necessary answers, 
but it does bound the outcomes of adaptation as “moderating harm”.  Adaptation 
cannot eliminate all the harm that is possible, but it can reduce it to an extent to be 
defined.   
There are other possible definitions, however.  Pelling defines adaptation as 
“the process through which an actor is able to reflect upon and enact change in 
those practices and underlying institutions that generate root and proximate causes 
of risk, frame capacity to cope and further rounds of adaptation to climate 
change”. (Pelling 2011) This is a far more ambitious vision than that of the IPCC, 
with goals set beyond minimizing harm to transformation of society’s 
characteristics that created the risks of climate change in the first place. 
 For purposes of this analysis, adaptation will be defined in terms much closer 
to that of the IPCC and to the concept of minimizing harm, leaving to another 
discussion the issue of broader societal changes as an outcome of adaptation.  The 
focus on minimizing harm is also a focus primarily on those choices to which 
decision makers will most likely devote attention, at least over the next several 
decades.    
The climate related change that will be the principal focus of analysis is 
sea level rise and consequent risks from both chronic and disaster related 
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flooding.  Climate change related effects on ocean thermal and chemistry 
characteristics are considered to the extent they affect coastal communities.  From 
this definition of the changes to be considered also flows the issue of vulnerability 
to be considered as those affecting the populations and economies of coastal 
areas. 
 Adaptation in this sense is closely related to the concept of resilience, which is 
generally defined as the ability to absorb a shock and return to the original pre-
shock condition.  Resilience is the operating framework for a number of public 
organizations such as NOAA2 as well as private organizations such as the Coastal 
Resilience network. 3   Resilience is a function of both capacity, meaning the 
institutions and processes needed to make adaptive/resilient decisions and the 
decisions that are made.  This merging of capacity and outcomes implies that over 
time the decisions that are made reinforce capacity and resilient outcomes grow in 
likelihood as a combination of growing capacity and choices made.   
The strategies leading to resilience affecting coastal communities are generally 
grouped in three categories:  
 Structural adaptation, or the modification of the built 
environment to minimize the effects of flooding; elevating 
buildings or other structures is a common example. 
 Creation of barriers, such as sea walls or tidal barriers or other 
engineered armoring of shorelines to prevent flood waters reaching 
critical assets. Barriers also include the use of natural barriers such 
as coral reefs or beaches to ameliorate flood damage potential. 
 Retreat, or the shifting of economic assets away from the 
shoreline and out of the flood zone so that the risks are eliminated. 
This paper focuses on questions of the use of economic theory and analysis to 
choose whether, when, and which of these strategies to employ.  Relevant 
decisions are assumed to be in the local regions where impacts will primarily 
occur, though decisions made at national or larger regional levels play important 
roles.  The assessment is relatively agnostic among these three choices as the best 
solutions are extremely dependent on local circumstances. (Ruckelshaus et al. 
2016)  There is an underlying assumption that adaptation choices will focus on 
                                                        
2 http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/resilience.html 
3  http://coastalresilience.org/ 
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the first two of these alternatives in most places before considering retreat, but the 
focus in the paper is on the long term and over time all of these options are in 
play. 
2.1 Making Rational Decisions Despite the Profound Uncertainty of Climate 
Change and its Effects 
The basic problem for economists is that climate change undercuts several 
bedrock theoretical principles, particularly in welfare economics, that economists 
have considered necessary for understanding the world. One of these is the way to 
make decisions when outcomes are primarily the outcome of stochastic processes. 
The other is how to make decisions when the consequences of those decisions 
may occur primarily beyond the lifespan of those who make the decision. Mixed 
into these discussions are questions about whether current individuals’ welfare is 
the appropriate metric for evaluating choices for individuals in the future. Climate 
change is not the only challenge to these basic principles, but it is one where 
finding the appropriate answers is particularly critical because of the magnitude of 
the stakes in the decisions to be guided by economic analysis. 
The problem of making decisions in a world where outcomes cannot be 
reliably known is one of the oldest problems in economics (Heal and Millner, 
2014). 
The problem was addressed as long ago as 1921 by Frank Knight who 
distinguished between risk, where probabilities could be defined, and uncertainty, 
where they could not (Knight 1921). The development of the concept of expected 
present value, or risk adjusted present value, by Von Neumann and Morgenstern 
appeared to provide a solution to the problem in a way that fully preserved the 
ability to develop quantitative models that could provide unique solutions given 
the inputs (J. Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944). In fact, this is the approach 
that is taken with many of the integrated climate change assessment models that 
have been developed, which integrate climate, physical process, and economic 
effects models to try to predict economic consequences. These include the FUND, 
DICE, and PAGE models (J. Weyant, 2014). 
The problem for climate change is that there are a number of reasons why it is 
extraordinarily difficult to translate uncertainty into risk in the Knight sense, a 
characteristic described as “deep uncertainty” (Lempert 2014). Others have 
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characterized it as a problem of “fat tails”, meaning that the ends of a probability 
distribution may be more likely and of larger consequence than implied by the 
“normal” curve. (Pindyck 2011; Nordhaus 2011) Climate change is considered a 
problem where either no probability can be meaningfully assigned or where the 
greatest-and worst threats- are at the extremes of (unknown) probability 
distributions, and thus are essentially useless for current decision making.  
The challenge in climate change, and associated effects like sea level rise, is 
not that there is a single “uncertainty” but that the situation with which decisions 
makers must struggle are the cumulative effects of many uncertainties including: 
how much climate change will occur, how much and how effective mitigation 
efforts will be, the pace and structure of demographic and economic change in 
vulnerable areas, and technological uncertainties that will affect both the extent of 
change and the possibility of adaptation for reducing damages. With these 
uncertainties, how can the economist’s principal tool for evaluation of choices, 
benefit-cost analysis, be used?  
A summary of these various issues is contained in the “dismal theorem” (M. 
L. Weitzman 2011). This holds that the extent of damages from climate change 
may be so catastrophic, even if of small likelihood of occurring, that the only 
rational choice is to devote virtually all output in the economy to preventing such 
outcomes. The probability distribution has a “fat” tail because of the magnitude of 
the possible changes, and the slope of the probability density function no longer 
conforms to the usual assumptions so the discount rate becomes infinite. Since 
neither an infinite discount rate nor devotion of all output to preventing damages 
from climate change is possible, benefit-cost analysis becomes essentially useless.  
The dismal theorem, and the entire debate about the applicability of 
economics to the climate change context, has its origins in the debate over the 
Stern Review, a study commissioned by the Government of the United Kingdom 
to investigate the economic case for action to reduce greenhouse gases (GHG). 
(Stern 2007) That seminal study concluded that drastic action to reduce GHG 
emissions was justified by the size of the threat. A major source of controversy 
about the Report was the use of a very low discount rate that significantly 
increased benefits to be realized in the distant future relative to present costs. A 
large number of comments on the Stern Report questioned the use of very low 
discount rates and the approach taken in the benefit-cost analysis of the Report 
(M. Weitzman 2007; J. P. Weyant 2008; Mendelsohn 2008)  
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The debate about discount rates and the use of benefit-cost analysis has been 
primarily focused on efforts to reduce GHG emissions, but the questions involved 
are equally applicable to the strategies to respond to sea level rise. The dismal 
adaptation corollary is that since the worst outcome is complete elimination of 
current shore uses, all resources should be devoted to adapting to the worst 
possible outcome. But this is not, in fact how sea level rise planning has been 
taking place.  
Rather, sea level rise has been modeled explicitly to provide visualizations of 
possible consequences. Examples include the NOAA Sea Level Rise Viewer4 and 
the estimates of the real estate data firm Zillow.5 The sea level rise viewers have 
the advantage of providing visual clues as to the possible consequences of sea 
level rise at specific places and under defined assumptions (for example which 
IPCC scenario to use) but the apparent precision of these models hides the deep 
uncertainty about what degree of sea level rise/flooding should actually be 
defined as the management goal for adaptation actions. The viewers provide no 
guidance about what to do in response to the predictions, when actions should be 
taken, and how these actions can be financed. We are left with the same problems 
of how to deal with multiple uncertainties and the same set of questions about 
how to deal with probabilities and discount rates. 
These apparent difficulties with the standard approaches to economic analysis 
have led to suggestions that noneconomic approaches be used to make decisions 
about how to deal with climate change. These have included applications of 
decision analysis, such as maximin analysis and robust decision-making 
(Kunreuther et al. 2013), as well as variations on multicriteria analysis (Hallegatte 
et al. 2011; Khazai et al. 2013; Toman 2014)   
These approaches have the advantage of avoiding many of the thorny issues 
involved in monetizing costs and benefits, as well as the problems of the social 
rate of time preference. But these virtues come at exactly the price that benefit-
cost analysis addresses: how we do we know what we are getting in return for the 
resources we must give up, and thus the issue circles back again towards the 
dismal theorem. 
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Perhaps the answer is to simply ignore the implications of the dismal theorem 
and simply proceed to conduct benefit-cost analyses. Benefit-cost is required as a 
condition for getting funding for adaptation from some government agencies such 
as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) when seeking 
adaptation assistance money. (FEMA 2009) Benefit-cost analysis has also been 
used as a screening tool to examine a range of adaptation alternatives to identify 
the most effective approaches for a given situation. (Economics of Climate 
Adaptation Working Group 2009) 
These project-level applications of benefit-cost analysis are quite important 
because they offer the opportunity to define and even expand the range of options 
for adaptation. A good example of this is the concept of “natural” or “green 
infrastructure”, which is the use of natural features such as shorelines, wetlands, 
coral reefs, and mangrove forests as protective structures. A growing body of 
studies demonstrates the technical feasibility of using natural infrastructure 
(Narayan et al. 2016; Shepard, Crain, and Beck 2011; Beck and Lange 2016) for 
protection of shoreline properties and economic evaluations are demonstrating 
their cost competitiveness. The paper by King is part of a growing body of 
literature that uses benefit-cost analysis to show that nature-based approaches to 
protecting coastal properties against sea level rise effects are very likely to be 
either competitive or superior to engineered armoring approaches such as seawalls 
(Newkirk et al. 2016; ENVIRON International Corporation 2015).  
Benefit-cost analysis can and will continue to play its traditional role in 
project and program evaluation, both ex ante and ex post. (Li, Mullan, and 
Helgeson, 2014), but the big questions about how to handle the uncertainties 
surrounding sea level rise and other effects remain. Each adaptation project 
evaluation will contain explicit or implicit assumptions about the extent and 
timing of sea level rise, which are in turn driven by assumptions about the degree 
of climate change. Analysts may take refuge in scenarios by choosing some 
combination of the IPCC scenarios and their sea level rise consequences then 
conducting analysis using “low”, “middle”, and “high” scenarios. This makes 
uncertainty visible and appears to reduce the scope of the problem, but still does 
not resolve the issue. If a project passes the benefit-cost test at the low scenario 
but not the middle scenario, what conclusion should be drawn? 
What then lies between benefit-cost analyses based on “best guesses” and the 
dismal theorem? A possible answer lies in conceiving of adaptation, at least for 
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those places not confronting immediate existential crises, as a sequence of 
decisions taken with progressively increasing information. The focus would be on 
helping decision-makers find a way to resolve uncertainty for their purposes 
rather than specifying an exact procedure to be used by everyone. Such a process 
would be grounded in five elements: (1) traditional benefit-cost models to define 
and narrow available options; (2) recognition of the problem from the decision 
maker’s perspective by incorporation of the insights of psychologists and others 
who have studied the way people respond to risk and uncertainty; (3) the 
application of statistical methods better suited to handling uncertainty to provide 
some, but not definitive guidance; (4) stakeholder processes where the 
perceptions of risks can be shaped for those who actually must make the decisions 
rather than for the analysts who must only arrive at a theoretically and empirically 
elegant solution; and (5) a continuing set of decisions in which the information 
from the first four elements permits choices between actions that should be taken 
in the present or postponed, and for those actions that are judged to be 
postponable, the specification of the information that will be needed to move the 
action from future to present. This process requires explicit choices by those 
involved in the decision process about how they will deal with uncertainty at each 
stage and, over time, the range of uncertainty can be reduced as new information 
becomes available.  
This approach implies a shift in focus from economic analysis that seeks the 
“optimum” adaptation strategy to economic analysis that supports a process of 
risk assessment and judgments grounded in the best available information, 
including economic information over a continuing set of decision points.  
This shift in perspective is critical because a large body of literature has 
shown that people’s perceptions of risk and uncertainty—and their choices in 
risky situations— are shaped by a variety of factors that are largely unconnected 
to the economist’s preferred tool of expected (probability adjusted) values. The 
seminal work by Kahneman and Tversky showed that people are biased against 
losses rather than the possibility of gains, and that the way in which a risk is 
described (framed) and the sources of the description have more to do with the 
choices made than any measurements of either probability or outcomes. 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Kahneman and Tversky 2000) Extended research 
into different aspects of risk perception and communication has offered a number 
of insights about how people actually respond to risk, including risk aversion, the 
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endowment effect, anchoring to recent events, and the extent of control that 
people feel that they have (Ropeik 2010). 
This literature is too large to explore all the possible ramifications, but three 
key findings provide some guidance for the adaptation problem. (1) People are 
risk averse—they are more worried about losses than gains. (2) The degree of 
control that people believe they have over risks affects whether they see risks as 
high or low. (3) People are less likely to act to reduce risks perceived to be remote 
in time or space. Taken together, these biases mean that adaptation decisions that 
would cost money today relative to remote risks where actions taken will still 
have uncertain outcomes would tend to be avoided or at the least postponed, but a 
clear sense that decisions will make a real difference in risks may encourage steps 
to assess the options. That assessment can then address risk aversion and 
remoteness.  
The processes to support adaptation should allow people to see both the risks 
of action and inaction; risk aversion cuts both ways. The availability of options 
for adaptation and funding resources (as discussed below) provides a measure of 
control. This will be the primary role of the kinds of benefit-cost analyses noted 
above. Finally, the focus on acting on what should be done in the near term while 
still addressing the long term places the decisions in a manageable context. 
Information about probabilities is still needed, whether through statistical 
analysis of historical data or the results of modeled futures is helpful, even if 
expressed only on a qualitative scale of “highly unlikely” to “highly likely”. Exact 
probabilities cannot be known but risk aversion means that people need some 
sense of the range of probabilities. In the climate change context, where 
historically derived frequentist based probabilities such as those used to calculate 
risks for flood insurance are decreasingly relevant, there are two possible 
approaches. One is to simulate probability distributions that do not yet exist 
through mechanisms such as Monte Carlo models (The Rhodium Group 2014). 
The alternative is to use Bayesian models that explicitly account for the risks of 
both action and inaction and which can do not rely on a specific historic pattern to 
be useful (though history can still be a part of the process) For these reasons, they 
are increasingly being used in situations with “deep uncertainty” (Cyert and 
DeGroot 1997) as well as in applications related to climate change (Zorrilla et al. 
2010; Gutierrez, Plant, and Thieler 2011). 
11
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A further element in bounding uncertainty is the use of scenarios, which will 
likely be used in addition to any statistical analysis if for no other reason than that 
scenarios are already integral to the IPCC analysis, which sets out multiple 
possible futures based on assumptions about the extent to which mitigation effects 
will be effective (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2014). IPCC 
scenarios tend to drive almost all climate change related planning simply because 
they are the most widely vetted and distributed. But scenario based planning is 
also a commonly used approach for long term problems. It is highly flexible in the 
types of information it can use but also simplifies the communication problem and 
allows stakeholders a major voice in setting the terms that will define the decision 
problem (Myers and Kitsuse 2000). 
But a word of caution is in order about scenario planning. Scenarios will be 
part of many processes, but they are methods of information integration, not 
information generation. There are many different approaches to the construction 
of scenarios (Amer, Daim, and Jetter 2013). Some processes seek only descriptive 
scenarios (this is what the world might look like) and others seek normative 
scenarios (this is what the world should look like). There are multiple 
methodologies for combining and simplifying large amounts of quantitative data 
(including forecasts), each of which introduce their own biases into the resulting 
scenarios. In any scenario process, there is a debate about the right number of 
scenarios to be examined. Two is generally considered too few, five or more are 
too many, which leaves three or four. Three scenarios inevitably attract attention 
to the middle scenario, while four require that two dimensions be identified to 
create the matrix.  
The final element in a revised economic approach is to recognize that the key 
probabilities are those of the decision makers and those who must concur with the 
decisions (the stakeholders) to decide which actions are most appropriate. There is 
evidence that rigorous group processes are capable of shaping risk perceptions 
and adaptive strategies that combine analysis of probabilities with the 
perspectives of individuals (Susskind et al. 2015). The key to success to help non-
experts to assess the uncertainty of climate change and formulate adaptation plans 
is to allow the group participants to define the levels of risk that they will use for 
the planning process. This is a recognition that it is the perceptions of risk are the 
key to motivating action, but also that better measurements of risk can influence 
those perceptions when introduced in a structured process. 
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This approach resembles the iterative approach to benefit-cost analysis 
suggested by The Economics of Climate Adaptation Working Group (ECAWG), 
but extends that proposal by adding the risk perception, and stakeholder process 
elements. ECAWG proposes a simple rule: conduct a benefit-cost analysis of 
alternatives, and identify those that are cost effective (have a benefit-cost ratio 
greater than one). Then deploy those options determined to be cost effective and 
leave the rest of the risk to insurance and reinsurance (Economics of Climate 
Adaptation Working Group 2009). The ECAWG benefit-cost analyses of major 
adaptation options were conducted using scenarios as way of addressing 
uncertainty and conducted their benefit-cost analyses with a twenty-year time 
frame. The results depend on choosing the scenario that best conforms to actual 
climate change effects. The adaptation options they assessed may have useful 
lives well beyond the twenty years for which they conducted the analysis, and 
thus the options may or may not be cost effective over longer periods. 
3. WHERE IS THE MONEY GOING TO COME FROM? 
The discussion in the previous section noted that a sense of control was an 
essential part of effectively confronting issues with high levels of uncertainty. 
While the many options for climate change in the IPCC scenarios (and associated 
sea level rise models) certainly reduce a sense of control, the factor that is perhaps 
most daunting to those who must make adaptation decisions is a sense that the 
needed resources needed are simply unavailable now and perhaps in the future. If 
there is no money, what can we do? The question of financing adaptation is thus 
not an issue to be decided once a plan has been formulated; it is a precursor to 
whether planning takes place at all. 
For some this may not seem like an economic question at all; in a sense it is a 
purely political question posed in terms of simply generating the political will to 
make the necessary investments (McKibben 2016). But Weitzman’s dismal 
theorem reminds us that no matter what the level of will, resources are still 
limited and no single source of funds is ever likely to be enough. The funding for 
coastal adaptation will, indeed, come from a complex mix of existing, emerging, 
and new sources of finance that will require as much creativity as the engineering 
of adaptation options themselves. Some options will require changes in current 
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institutions or creation of new institutions, but these are barriers that can be 
overcome. 
Infrastructure to shield shorelines against erosion has historically been 
financed either by the public, through standard financing (e.g. road budgets or 
natural hazard disaster funding), or the private sector when property owners build 
to protect their individual properties. But a combination of forces has expanded 
the sources and types of funding available and this expansion will likely continue. 
These forces are driven by: 
1. The sheer size of damages from natural hazards, which has 
greatly increased, partly due to climate change but mostly due to 
the steady increase of human uses in hazard prone areas.  
2. The pressures on public budgets resulting from the Great 
Recession of 2007-2009 and its aftermath. 
3. The development of new approaches to climate change 
adaptation, particularly the nature-based or “green” infrastructure 
concepts that were noted in the benefit-cost studies discussed 
earlier. 
The increasingly complex array of financing options can be usefully depicted 
with a relatively simple framework such as that presented in Figure 1. The 
framework’s structure derives from distinguishing who pays for adaptation and 
who benefits from it using a standard public goods/private goods framework. Pure 
public goods are non-excludable in production (once produced the benefits are 
widely available) and non-rival in consumption (one person’s consumption does 
not diminish anyone else’s consumption); pure private goods are both excludable 
and rival. Because of non-excludability and non-rivalry, public goods cannot be 
paid for in proportion to the amount consumed as private goods can. The division 
is not so clear because many goods are mixes of benefits with mixed levels of 
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Benefits are purely public 
Cannot be meaningfully 
divided among users to 
allocate costs 
Options 
 General Tax Revenues 
 General Obligation Bonds 
 Specialized Consumption 
Tax 
 Post-disaster recovery 
funding 
II 
Private funds provide 
benefits greater than the 
private funder realizes 
 Impact Investing 
 Green Bonds 
Private organization created 
to share benefits among 
organization 
members/funders 
 Hazard Assessment 
Districts 





 Revenue Bonds 





Publicly subsidized private 
expenditures 
 Tax Subsidies 
 Income Tax Credits 
 Property Tax Credits 
 Valuation adjustments 
IV 
Private charges for service in 
proportion to private benefits 
 Goods/Service Charges 
 Insurance/Reinsurance 
 Catastrophe Bonds 
 Resilience Bonds 
Figure 1. Financing matrix 
4. DISCUSSION OF FINANCING MATRIX QUADRANTS 
Quadrant I: Public Benefits, Public Funding 
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This is the classic public goods situation, where funding comes from general tax 
sources, either present period (appropriations) or as debt (bonds). This general 
purpose revenue and expenditure source is what many officials look to when the 
subject of funding comes up, because appropriations, grants, loans, etc. are all 
part of the normal structure of government spending. But it is precisely this source 
that is most under stress from other demands. 
Quadrant I could contain major public appropriations programs for adaptation 
like general public infrastructure in the U.S., but in fact, while some European 
countries have devoted general revenues to adaptation (the Netherlands has 
effectively been doing so for decades), such funding is not available in the U.S. 
Rather, the largest source of Quadrant I funding for dealing with the effects of sea 
level rise related flooding in the U.S. is post-disaster recovery funding. These are 
the appropriations made to cover losses to public and private property following a 
disaster that are over and above insurance payments. Such post-disaster funding is 
now common in the U.S. and occurs in other countries as well. (Jackson 2013; 
The Council of the European Union 2002) It is an issue for general public goods 
financing in Quadrant I because this source always serves as the ultimate backstop 
for all recovery funding, and it is the first line of defense for most publicly owned 
property, which is essentially self-insured.  
In fact, the U.S. National Flood Insurance Program was never designed to 
cover catastrophic losses. Premiums and coverages were designed for predictable 
floods and in what was thought to be the extremely rare event of a flood beyond 
the 100-year level, the flood insurance funds from which claims were to be paid 
would be supplemented with appropriations. What has happened since the 1970s, 
and particularly over the last decade with Katrina, Sandy, and other record floods 
is that the “reinsurance” (the money “borrowed” from general revenues to pay 
claims) now dwarfs the actual insurance to the point where it is uneconomic to 
ever repay the “debt” with premiums (Michel-Kerjan 2010). Technically 
classified as generally available public expenditures, post-disaster funding is 
considered a problem of public budgeting like many others, but it should perhaps 
be better considered as the ultimate reinsurance for coastal areas and thus is 
connected to the funding discussed in Quadrant IV, as discussed below. 
A major issue with post disaster funding is the distinction between the uses of 
such funds to restore lost properties and the use of such funds to reduce future 
damages (that is to adapt to future risks). In some places, such as the United 
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States, the policy is that recovery funding is to be used only for the purposes of 
replacing what was lost, not for upgrading infrastructure making other adaptive 
changes. This policy is designed to stretch recovery resources as much as 
possible, but it has the effect of limiting the flow of funds to adaptive measures at 
precisely the time that it would be least expensive to deploy them because the 
expenditures are now incremental to the recovery efforts. 
A special case of public goods funding is the levying of general taxes 
dedicated to specific purposes. For example, many U.S. local jurisdictions (cities 
and counties) levy a special sales tax within a jurisdiction and use the revenues to 
support specific purposes, such as transportation improvements or the 
construction and operation of civic/convention centers. This is a variation on the 
strategy identified in Quadrant II of creating special purpose districts. The 
difference is that in Quadrant I, the revenues for the special purpose come from 
all or a subset of general taxpayers, while in Quadrant II the revenues come from 
those who most directly benefit. 
Quadrant II: Public Benefits, Private Funding 
“Impact investing” is one of the most important areas of innovation in finance 
over the last decade. (J.P. Morgan Global Research and The Rockefeller 
Foundation 2010). In impact investing, private funds are pooled to purchase a 
debt instrument which will be repaid at a market or near-market rate, but which 
will fund projects that have general benefits beyond those realized by either the 
bond buyer or seller. Impact investing has been used in a variety of fields 
including health and social services, but the most relevant version for current 
purposes is the category of “Green Bonds” or, when applied to ocean-related uses 
“Blue Bonds” (The World Bank; World Economic Forum, 2013). 
“Green bonds” are a general category of debt used for environmentally related 
purposes. Perhaps the major current use is for “climate bonds”, which are used 
primarily to pay for greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation efforts, such as renewable 
energy or energy efficiency projects. In the most common type of climate bonds 
the “impact” is a certified reduction in emissions, with the reduction being 
measured in physical and/or economic terms. Independent certifying agencies 
have arisen to perform the audits of project effectiveness. Such bonds, with their 
accompanying non-financial metrics, have begun to be proposed for adaptation 
projects, but this is still at an early stage and the development of impact metrics 
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for adaptation projects has not proceeded at nearly the pace that it has with respect 
to energy and GHG mitigation. The development of such metrics for measuring 
the effectiveness of sea level rise adaptation projects such as natural infrastructure 
will determine the extent to which “impact investing” becomes a source of 
funding. 
A second approach in this quadrant is the creation of special purpose districts, 
where taxes or fees are charged to the residents of the district and the resulting 
revenues are used for the general benefit of the district’s residents. Water and 
sewer fees are one of the oldest arrangements of this type, and this principle has 
evolved into the creation of stormwater districts to fund the additional 
infrastructure needed to manage high volume water flows during storms. 
Stormwater districts are, to all intents and purposes, an adaptation strategy related 
to climate change, although not all stormwater infrastructure or financing is 
explicitly sized to manage climate change-related effects (Colgan, Kartez, and 
Sheils 2016). 
Other examples of this approach are the levee districts that support 
maintenance of flood control infrastructure in the lower Mississippi valley, 
California, and Florida. The capital cost of constructing levees is usually born by 
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, but operating and maintenance costs are a 
local responsibility. Local funding often comes from surcharges on the property 
tax in the protected areas, but when these are inadequate, levee boards have tried a 
wide variety of ways to fund operating costs, from leasing levee space for cell 
phone towers to taking contributions from casinos (Miller 2012).  
Another variation is the use of tax increment financing. This approach is a 
version of the special purpose district, where the increment from the development 
of new real property is set aside and used for specific purposes. (Dye and 
Merriman 2006) Tax increment financing is used for a wide number of purposes, 
from building infrastructure directly related to a project whose property tax 
increment is captured to rebating a portion of the tax increment directly to the 
project sponsor as an incentive. Tax increment financing could be used to fund 
shoreline protection or to pay for adaptive building modifications for new 
shoreline developments or, in some cases, existing development. 
These variations on the theme of regional or community level organized, 
collected, and used financing represent one of the largest opportunities for 
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securing the needed financing for adaptation. The approach builds on existing 
financing models and has the major advantage of being an approach that enhances 
the local/regional control over the way in which adaptation is carried out. 
Communities can, in the right circumstances, design not only the technical, 
engineering, and policy approaches to adaptation but the financing mechanisms as 
well. 
Quadrant III: Public Payment, Private Benefits 
This is the general category of public subsidies to private beneficiaries and is in a 
sense the obverse of Quadrant I. From the public budget perspective, funding in 
Quadrant I and Quadrant III are equivalent; resources are expended or revenues 
foregone. But Quadrant III targets the resources to those with a specific tax nexus, 
most likely in terms of income or property values. It is a good example of the 
mixed nature of funding and benefits, because such subsidies are usually justified, 
however loosely, as having some broader public purpose, but the primary benefits 
tend to accrue to a narrow group.  
There are many variations in how tax subsidies can be made available (credits, 
deductions, exclusions, depreciation allowances, etc.). Tax subsidies are generally 
only useful in jurisdictions with sophisticated tax systems. 
Quadrant IV: Private Payments, Private Benefits 
As with Quadrant I, this is a common funding approach. Individual property 
owners have been taking steps to protect their property against shoreline erosion 
for centuries. But the heart of financing in this part of the framework is insurance, 
which is technically a private payment to cover a risk. In some ways, insurance is 
the economic “ground zero” for climate change, since it is insurance, whether 
provided by private industry, public programs, or the ultimate insurance of special 
public expenditures for disaster recovery (discussed in Quadrant I) where the 
costs of sea level rise in coastal regions will be most visible. Flood insurance 
(including special post disaster funding) is the largest single pool of funding 
dedicated to the problems of flooding and sea level rise; finding the appropriate 
role for these funds in adaptation is perhaps the major funding challenge.  
There are traditional insurance issues of coverage and pricing that must be 
addressed. How much should insurance cover from flood damages, whether from 
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catastrophic flooding or nuisance flooding (frequent low level flooding of streets 
and properties)? Should insurance pay to reduce future risks or merely to recover 
what is lost? What price should be charged for insurance and should the insurance 
be mandatory or voluntary? There are also distributional issues about the relative 
responsibilities of public and private insurance: Does the common practice of 
appropriating emergency funds to recover from flood disasters create a moral 
hazard problem for flooding or reduce the incentive for the purchase of insurance?  
For insurers, both public and private, there are choices to be made about how 
much of their capital and payouts should be used to reduce future risks and what 
strategy should be used to reduce such risks? 
These issues are complicated by the structure of insurance, which is provided 
in a two-tier system 6 . The first tier is the insurance purchased directly on 
properties either from private insurance companies or from government programs. 
The second tier is reinsurance, which is insurance purchased by first tier providers 
against especially large claims. There is a combination of private and public 
institutions involved in both tiers, with the precise mix determined by national 
policies. Flood insurance is provided entirely by the private property and causality 
insurance industry in most European countries, but it is provided by the public 
sector in the U.S. through the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). 
Reinsurance is provided primarily by the private sector for privately provided 
primary insurance and the government provides it for publicly provided primary 
insurance. The public sector also provides both primary and reinsurance for 
publicly owned property—that is the public sector effectively self- insures. 
The same questions that are raised concerning primary insurance above also 
apply to reinsurance. What role can reinsurance play in reducing future risks by 
funding, directly (through specific investments) or indirectly (through reduced 
fees passed on to consumers) adaptive measures? 
In addition to using public disaster recovery appropriations for adaptation in 
addition to recovery as discussed above, there are two possible sources of 
adaptation funds from the insurance markets. One is from the pooling of savings 
in the primary markets, the other from the flexibility created by innovations in 
reinsurance.  
                                                        
6  There is a third level called retrocession, which is essentially reinsurance for the 
reinsurers. Most of the same issues applying to reinsurance apply to retrocession, so it is 
not included in detail here. 
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5. POOLING SAVINGS 
The National Flood Insurance Program and the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency do take two important steps towards encouraging adaptation. One is a 
grants program that provides funds to communities to invest in adaptive 
infrastructure, when such investments pass a benefit-cost test (see above). The 
second is the Community Rating System, which offers discounts on flood 
insurance premiums in communities that undertake specific types of steps to 
reduce risks, such as limiting rebuilding in flood areas (National Flood Insurance 
Program 2006). The CRS is a good example of the kind of economic incentives 
for adaptation that may be needed, but participation by communities remains low 
and the adequacy of the incentives given increasing risks is open to question. 
Moreover, the CRS and the infrastructure programs address community level 
adaptation actions, not individual property actions. Nothing prevents communities 
from pooling the savings on flood insurance premiums to invest in further 
adaptation measures, but such pooling of savings has not yet occurred.  
6. REINSURANCE 
Insurance is possible because risks can be measured with sufficient confidence 
that capital can be attracted to provide recompense for losses while still creating a 
return to capital through other investments. But insurance companies also live 
with the risks of losses at the tail ends of the probability curves on which they rely 
for their “normal” businesses. At these “catastrophic tails”, primary insurers do 
not have adequate capital to pay policyholders. To cover these risks, insurance 
companies purchase backup or reinsurance.  
As insurance for the largest catastrophes reinsurance is generating much 
interest in considering climate change risk management. It is the reinsurers who 
are left to cover the losses from tropical and extra tropical cyclones and other 
weather events that were once extraordinary but will become ordinary. 
Reinsurance is a highly specialized industry and providing reinsurance is highly 
skilled work. Deciding what to cover and at what price when the risks at hand 
occur relatively infrequently is one of the most difficult challenges in managing 
risks. As it has evolved, reinsurance accomplishes this task through a complex 
network of relationships among the individuals who work for the reinsurance 
firms and the individuals who work for the insurance firms who purchase their 
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services. This network of experts in regular contact with one another allows 
reinsurers to decide how much of a given risk (hurricane damages, for example) 
the reinsurer will cover and at what price they will provide coverage to the 
primary insurer (Jarzabkowski, Bednarek, and Spee 2015). These relationships 
among individuals are cultivated and maintained over extended periods and it is 
the confidence in the relationships that permits pricing decisions to be made. 
Because so much depends on individual relationships, the number of reinsurance 
firms is quite small. 
But this traditional relationship-based reinsurance industry is undergoing 
significant change brought about by two different trends. The first is that 
reinsurers are becoming more and more reliant on computer based integrated 
assessment models to assess risks. These models combine information on hazard-
causing phenomena, such as flooding, with economic information about the 
magnitude of values at risk. They supplement relationship-based information and 
the traditional approach but at the same time the formal economic and related 
meteorological and hydrological analysis opens the door for assessing risks to a 
larger circle than the traditional reinsurance specialists. 
The other major change in reinsurance might be described as the 
“securitization” of reinsurance through the development of a new class of 
financial instruments called catastrophe bonds. (Swiss Re 2012; Alvarez 2015) 
Catastrophe bonds are a means to create reinsurance for a short period in a 
specific area. The bond is issued through a “special purpose vehicle” (SPV) under 
the laws of countries such as the Bahamas or Grand Cayman Islands. The SPV 
becomes essentially a temporary reinsurance company created for one specific set 
of hazards in one specific pace.  The bond issuer creates and sells a bond that will 
pay the purchaser of the bond a fixed repayment and return over the life of the 
bond (usually three years). Under the terms of the bonds, if a specified set of 
events with specific parameters occur during the life of the bond, such as a 
hurricane that damages more than $X million in property, then the proceeds of the 
bond, which are held in trust until maturity, are liquidated and the funds used to 
pay the reinsurance claims. Essentially, the seller of the bond is betting that the 
catastrophe will not occur and they will be repaid the face amount plus interest. 
The bond seller is effectively acting as an insurance company collecting the 
equivalent of premiums but having to pay out if the catastrophe occurs.  
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Catastrophe bonds have several advantages, of which the most important is 
that they attract additional capital into the pool of reinsurance funds, without 
having to establish new reinsurance companies or rely on recreating the network 
of expert relationships on which reinsurance depends. The availability of the 
formal risk models noted above is essential to this process because the risk 
modelers’ results are available to anyone who purchases them. The fundamental 
mechanism for attracting this additional capital is the ability of catastrophe bonds 
to create a well-defined and narrow portion of the total risk, and a market in 
which purchasers of the bonds may assess the portion of the risk they are asked to 
bear relative to other similar investment opportunities. Catastrophe bonds have 
been described as performing a transformation in financial markets for 
reinsurance like the securitization of mortgage lending over the past twenty years. 
(Jarzabkowski, Bednarek, and Spee 2015) 
The new capital flowing into the insurance process from catastrophe bonds is 
a possible target for use in financing adaptation. The parties to the catastrophe 
bond have a mutual interest in avoiding the conditions requiring the bond be used 
to pay claims and, to the extent those conditions are defined by damage size 
parameters, both have an interest in using some of the bond proceeds to invest in 
damage-reducing adaptations. In fact, this idea has been developed into a proposal 
for “resilience bonds” (Vajhala and Rhodes 2015). Resilience bonds represent a 
direct connection from insurer to adaptation action, though such bonds have not 
yet been shown to be marketable.  
However, the resilience bond approach is not the only way that reinsurers can 
reduce their risks. The traditional method of diversifying the risk portfolio may be 
more attractive in many cases. Instead of investing in physical projects, 
catastrophe bonds can be tailored to cover a smaller part of the risk, leaving others 
to cover the rest. Resilience bonds provide new options for attracting capital to 
adaptation but they will operate in competition with risk reduction through 
diversification strategies and their ultimate role is not clear. 
Before leaving the discussion of insurance, it is important to note that there 
are a number of distortions in the flood insurance market through the under-
insured and the over-insured, that limit the possible roles of insurance in 
supporting adaptation, particularly in the U.S. Public flood insurance in the U.S. 
is not charging premiums sufficient to cover damages let alone further risk 
23
Colgan: Economics of Coastal Climate Change Adaptation
Published by Digital Commons @ Center for the Blue Economy, 2016
reduction. 7  Efforts to make insurance accessible by keeping premiums low 
transfer the risk from the insured to the insurance program and ultimately onto the 
public treasury, while efforts to recover costs for the insurance program move 
public insurance into the same premium territory as private insurance. 
(Committee on Risk-Based Methods for Insurance Premiums 2015) These 
problems exist even before the effects of sea level rise are factored in. The 
National Flood Insurance Program still plans for and prices for the 100-year flood 
(a 1% per year probability of flooding), the same as when the program was 
established fifty years ago.  
Even with the mispricing, there are still many uninsured properties, which are 
properties that have no flood insurance and do not have sufficient assets to self-
insure. Even worse are those properties that are located outside currently defined 
hazard zones, but are also located inside emergent hazard zones created by sea 
level rise. In many parts of the world properties in near shore areas that should be 
covered by flood insurance because of changing threats from sea level rise are not 
even currently eligible to buy the insurance, and thus are provided no insurance 
price signals to take adaptive actions. 
At the same time, there is also a significant problem of the over-insured, 
exemplified by what the National Flood Insurance Program defines as repetitive 
loss properties (King 2005), which are defined as one or more flood insurance 
claims payments that each exceeded $5,000, with at least two of those payments 
occurring in a 10-year period, and with the total claims paid exceeding $20,000; 
or two or more flood insurance claims payments that together exceeded the value 
of the property. Such properties are generally not charged actuarially accurate 
premiums, thus placing additional stress on the insurance pool to the point where 
the entire existence of public flood insurance is called into question. (Mcguire, 
Goodman, and Wright 2015) The over-insured also represent the clearest example 
of moral hazard where insurance-based incentives for risk reduction are almost 
eliminated. 
                                                        
7 The extent to which flood insurance is unsupportable in private markets is largely a 
function of policy choices. European countries such as the U.K. and Germany make flood 
insurance mandatory within standard homeowner policies, thus spreading the risk and 
reducing premiums. The U.S. chose not to mandate flood insurance because insurance 
is traditionally regulated at the state level rather than the national level. Create a new 
national program at the federal level avoided conflicts with the states but left the federal 
government with the problems associated with a voluntary insurance pool. 
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The scale of funding needs for adaptation is indeed daunting and there are no 
grant programs immediately and easily available to pay those costs. But a careful 
arrangement of existing possible sources will greatly increase the pool of 
resources available. This arrangement can tentatively be characterized as follows: 
1.  Use general tax revenues to fund the largest projects with the 
greatest benefits, such as proposals to build tidal barriers across the 
entrance to New York Harbor like the barriers on the Thames and 
in the Netherlands.  
2. Encourage the formation of local financing districts using fees, 
taxes and tax increments, insurance savings, and other funding 
streams flowing from the benefits of reduced flood risks. 
3. Tap the growing “green bonds” market by establishing 
certifiable standards for risk reduction impacts that could attract 
bond buyers interested in the adaptation side of climate change 
finance. 
4. Funds for disaster responses should always pay for both 
recovery and reduced risks. This is especially true of general 
public revenues used for disaster recovery but could also be true of 
catastrophe bonds and other insurance payments. Every disaster is 
an opportunity to reduce risks and no opportunity should be missed 
to do so. 
5. Flood insurance, public or private, should be managed and 
priced to encourage risk reducing adaptation actions whenever 
possible. Revised building codes that mandate risk reducing 
adaptation should be funded through reduced insurance costs. 
This discussion of financing as part of developing adaptation strategies began 
by noting that finance is essential to provide a sense of control over the problem. 
That control lies primarily in communities planning for adaptation to be aware of 
their options under elements 2 and 3 in the above list and to incorporate those in 
their planning. Elements 1 and 4 will require actions above the community level 
but will be essential to developing effective adaptation strategies. 
7. VULNERABILITY AND RESPONSES OF REGIONS AND 
INDUSTRIES 
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A major theme in the climate change economics literature and in economic 
studies of coastal and oceans effects is measuring the dimensions of economic 
vulnerability. In general, these vulnerability studies have provided very good 
information about the stakes involved in sea level rise and have been successful in 
raising awareness, but there are two very large gaps in the literature: First, almost 
all studies have examined the possible effects of climate change in the late 21st 
century on the economy on the economy and population of the early 21st century. 
Coupled forecasts of climate change with forecasts of economic and demographic 
change are notably lacking. And because little attention has been paid to linking 
the forces driving socioeconomic change to climate change, even less attention is 
being paid to how economic forces will shape the changes in local, regional, and 
national economies that follow the effects that climate change will have on coasts 
and oceans. This results in the second major gap: the tendency in vulnerability 
studies to focus on comparative statics rather than the dynamic changes in local 
and regional economies after events such as major floods.  
Economic vulnerability assessments with specific attention to the 
consequences of sea level rise have been done at both the national and regional 
levels, with regions defined very broadly and very narrowly. The most common 
metric of vulnerability is property losses (Gordon 2014; Yoskowitz, Gibeaut, and 
McKenzie 2009) and public infrastructure losses (J. E. Neumann et al. 2003; 
ICLEI 2013). Property damage vulnerability studies have become so common that 
they are being reported in the press. (Brady 2016) Social vulnerability, defined as 
impacts on populations with particular characteristics, such as low income, 
immigrant, the elderly, and disabled are also frequently assessed. (Cutter, Boruff, 
and Shirley 2003; ICLEI 2013) There have also been studies vulnerabilities of 
particular ocean economy sectors. (Jepson and Colburn 2013)  
There have been some macroeconomic models that have translated property 
losses into reductions in capital stock and business interruptions (Jorgenson et al. 
2004) into losses in productivity that affect economy-wide output (The Rhodium 
Group 2014). But vulnerability studies need to be at the regional and local levels 
to inform decision-making where adaptation decisions will be made. There is a 
fairly large literature on the economic impacts of flooding disasters conducted on 
an ex post basis (Colgan and Adkins 2006; Mu and Chen 2016), but there do not 
appear to be many studies translating this understanding of the historical record 
into projections of possible future changes. There are also studies that have set out 
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to assess vulnerability on regional economic functioning by looking at possible 
employment impacts (Colgan and Merrill 2008) or by creating multivariate 
indictor series to create a more complete picture than single metrics (Khazai et al. 
2013; Song et al. 2016). 
A common theme to many of these studies is that the vulnerability metrics 
chosen are relatively easy to locate geographically. Property tax records, the 
locations of public infrastructure, and detailed Census records are all generally 
available at sufficient geographic detail that they can be matched using 
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) to the outputs of various forms of 
hydrographic/climate models. GIS analysis makes it possible to closely match the 
distribution of possible flooding/inundation impacts to estimate total potential 
property losses, population affected, or infrastructure facilities disrupted.8  
The current regional economic vulnerability studies are very valuable in 
raising awareness of the effects of sea level rise, but are still addressing only a 
part of the issue. A high priority should be integrating demographic and economic 
forecasts into the integrated sea level rise models so that the time periods of 
projected sea level rise and its effects are at least in the same decade. Long range 
economic and demographic forecasting is obviously subject to a high degree of 
forecast error, but these types of forecasts are undertaken all the time for 
infrastructure planning (particularly transportation) as well as for long-term land 
use plans. In many cases, such forecasts already exist for these larger purposes 
and are available at detailed enough geographies (census tracts or transportation 
analysis zones) to match the geographic detail of flooding/inundation modeling. If 
they are otherwise available, there are several options to construct such models 
(REMI, REDYN) using standard regional models.  
Forecasts are also essential to introduce explicit consideration of the key 
economic and demographic forces shaping vulnerability. For example, many parts 
                                                        
8  The availability of detailed geo-located data clearly facilitates the development of 
economic vulnerability analyses, but such data is not always available, particularly in the 
case of low income countries. In many cases, it is necessary to build vulnerability 
analyses from the top down rather than the bottom up. Disaggregation of economic data 
is a standard practice, which will be needed in many cases where forecasted conditions 
are used in the vulnerability analysis as discussed below. The simplest disaggregations 
use a combination of geographic and population criteria, such as the global 1km grid 
GDP data created by the United Nations Environment Program (Global Change and 
Vulnerability Unit 2012) 
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of the U.S. coast currently house a disproportionately older population because 
they are centers for retirement and because of overall aging of the U.S. 
population. But the demographic profile of these areas in 50 years will almost 
certainly be different because of restructuring of national and regional populations 
as the baby boom generation gives way to its successors. Another example is that 
many communities are located in what are currently the transition zones between 
urban and rural economies; by the end of the century, many such communities 
may be entirely urban (if outward spreading of urban space continues) or may 
remain transitional or even become more rural if urban space recentralizes. The 
differences in possible vulnerability for these communities are quite significant 
depending on how urban space evolves. 
The longer-term dynamics of regional change are an essential part of the 
story, but many coastal areas are also characterized by the short-term dynamics of 
seasonality. It is not uncommon for coastal areas that are popular tourist 
destinations to see populations grow in high season by a factor of five or more 
and for economic activity to triple or even quadruple. Such seasonal variations 
clearly alter the economic values at stake in assessing vulnerability, yet most 
economic and population data used in vulnerability studies is either annual 
average data or measured at only point in the year (often in the low season 
precisely to avoid the effects of seasonal growth). Seasonal variations in 
population and economy are essential to vulnerability studies in many areas. 
The addition of a dynamic perspective on regional economies to better 
understand how future economies may be vulnerable to future threats should also 
be coupled to a better understanding of how economies will respond to those 
threats. Relatively little has been done to consider this aspect of adaptation, but if 
the previous sections are correct that adaptation will be a long term iterative 
process then the ability to forecast each iteration of the economy, however 
imperfectly, will be an essential element in strategy formulation.  
The Khazai et al. study gets close to the kind of regional impact analysis that 
is needed, with the inclusion of an industrial vulnerability index, which includes 
such impact-causing factors related to flooding as labor availability, supply 
chains, and dependency on water and electric power. The paper applies the 
industrial vulnerability index, together with guides measuring regional 
dependency, and social fragmentation to the German state of Baden-
Wurerttenburg. The approach in this paper begins to focus on the dynamics of 
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regional change and of industrial impact, though it does so still within a 
comparative statics model of vulnerability.  
But there are still major weaknesses to be addressed. The Khazai et al. 
industrial index is constructed entirely for goods-producing industries, including 
selected manufacturing and construction industries. This ignores the fact that the 
urban areas where economic vulnerability from sea level rise is most acute are 
predominantly non-manufacturing regions. Nor is there much focus on ocean 
related industries in the literature, such as coastal tourism and recreation or 
marine transportation, although impact studies on ports available (Hallegatte et al. 
2011; Lempert, Sriver, and Keller 2012). 
The idea of economic vulnerability as a function of the structure of the 
local/regional economy has also not been explored from the perspective of local 
clusters that may be disproportionately at risk. Clusters are complex networks of 
relationships among businesses and other institutions within the region whose 
cumulative effect is to confer competitive advantages through external economies 
of scale (Porter 1998). Disruption of clusters or economic base industries may 
lead to significant shifts of activity outside the region if the locations of existing 
firms become untenable because of persistent flooding disasters.  
Ocean-dependent activities provide a good example of vulnerability extending 
beyond sea level rise to include effects on the ocean such as changes in ocean 
temperatures, as oceans absorb the greatest share of atmospheric warming, and 
ocean acidification, as the extra carbon dioxide in the atmosphere changes the 
chemistry of the oceans. The major threats from these changes will be to fisheries 
and to ecosystems such as coral reefs, which are critical habitat in their own right 
and, in many areas, a key resource for both fishing and tourism industries (Cooley 
and Doney 2009; Kroeker, Micheli, and Gambi 2013; Kleypas and Yates 2009). 
There are already significant concerns about fishing communities in Alaska. 
(Himes-Cornell and Kasperski 2015), and the National Marine Fisheries Service 
has conducted a survey of fishing communities’ vulnerability to climate change 
(Jepson and Colburn 2013). Similar threats to tourism and recreation related 
communities have not been examined. 
While the focus in this paper has primarily been on sea level rise and flooding, 
particularly from catastrophic events, the vulnerability of fishing communities 
from changes in thermal regimes and chemistry represents a different set of 
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challenges for economists than the issues related to sea level rise that requires a 
moment’s reflection. Thermal and chemical changes will be more gradual than 
catastrophic, with subtle ecosystem changes transforming fisheries over relatively 
long period. These trends will give more time for adaptation plans to be 
formulated and implemented, but will also mean that catalytic events that focus 
attention on the problems will be less likely.  
Changes in the ecosystem will reduce the abundance of some commercially 
important species to the point where they are no longer economically viable. An 
example is the lobster fishery in southern New England, which has declined from 
a stock of over 50 million U.S. short tons (45.36 million metric tons) to less than 
10 million U.S. short tons (9.1 million metric tons), primarily due to warming 
waters (Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission 2015). In such cases the 
fishing industry may shift to fishing for other species. This is not an uncommon 
change; as fishing has dropped due to regulation to prevent overfishing, shifts to 
other species have become common. This experience needs to be examined as an 
example of how climate-induced shifts in ocean ecosystems and fisheries may 
change the fishing industry. 
But simply shifting fishing effort may not be an option, or it may not be an 
option for sufficient numbers of fish harvesters, to maintain communities, 
particularly in fishing-dependent communities. The transition of communities and 
economies dependent on single resource bases will become increasingly common 
in fishing communities, but such transitions have already occurred in regional 
economies dependent on mining, agriculture, and forests. These are among the 
most difficult changes in regional economics and economic development and thus 
define a different type of economic vulnerability (Wu, Barkley, and Weber 2008). 
The current approach to economic vulnerability studies serves well to raise 
awareness of the stakes at issue in failing to either prevent further climate change 
or reduce the damages from climate change that has already occurred. But 
economics has barely begun the equally important tasks of understanding how 
local and regional economies are changing, how those changes will affect future 
vulnerabilities, and how the responses to the effects of climate change will 
reshape those local and regional economies. Comparative statics analyses will not 
serve the dynamic, iterative adaptive processes discussed here. Moreover, 
economic vulnerability studies become the foundation for benefit-cost analyses 
based on expected losses avoided through adaptation measures. If we are 
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evaluating a project to protect a $10 million property today, the possibility that 
there will be five more such properties in thirty years’ time needs to be 
considered. If it is not, beneficial adaptation options could be rejected as too 
costly. In this case, our limited knowledge today would result in seriously 
underestimating the future benefits of adaptive measures.  
8. THE ECONOMICS OF COASTAL MANAGEMENT UNDER SEA 
LEVEL RISE 
Adaptation emerges from the discussion so far as an iterative, flexible process 
where choices are made over time based on continually improving information 
and resources expanding to meet needs. These are the characteristics that have 
allowed economists’ advocacy of market or market-like approaches to dominate 
policy choices about GHG reductions. Can the same characteristics of flexibility 
and iterative improvements guide the choices of specific adaptation strategies? 
The answer will depend on whether climate change and sea level rise present an 
opportunity to evolve the approaches to coastal management that have evolved 
based on the approaches to environmental management that were dominant in the 
1970s. 
Coasts have long been recognized as unique assets. The competition among 
human uses and between human uses and ecosystems gave rise to the movement 
for coastal zone management in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The United States 
and many other developed countries were the first to develop and implement 
CZM programs, and today most countries have some version of a CZM program 
following support for the concept in various UN agreements(Cicin-Sain and 
Knecht 1998). For the most part, CZM programs follow largely traditional land 
use and environmental regulatory approaches, allowing real estate markets to 
perform basic allocation of space to users, subject to review by at least one level 
of regulatory review. This is a system that generally works well, but if sea level 
rise ultimately reshapes shorelines and coastal regions at anywhere near even 
some of the relatively modest projections of one meter or so (to say nothing of 
projections of five meters or more), then there is a serious question whether 
traditional approaches to coastal management can keep up with the possible 
changes. 
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Regulatory programs can be effective, but they can also be time consuming 
and expensive to plan and implement. Rapid adjustments within regulatory 
programs are difficult. The question arises, therefore, whether some of the virtues 
of markets might be adapted to coastal management purposes to create systems 
which can achieve the purposes of balanced uses of the coasts with more flexible, 
incentive-oriented approaches. This is, of course, a point that economists have 
been making for more than 40 years (Kneese and Schulze 1975), and there is now 
substantial experience with such market approaches to environmental policy as 
emissions trading (Tietenberg 2006).  
The key concepts to considering how market mechanisms might facilitate 
better coastal management are ecosystems services and natural capital. Ecosystem 
services and natural capital have become a major focus of attention, particularly 
in the international environmental and development spheres because of efforts by 
global institutions such as the United Nations and the World Bank to explicitly 
incorporate concepts of sustainability into development aid programs. The 
European Union has also made a major commitment to building measurement of 
ecosystem services into policy making, and has partnered with the United Nations 
to put out the first major standards for incorporation of ecosystem services into 
standard measures of economic performance (Weber 2011).  
Several projects are actively examining how to value ecosystem services and 
how to use this information in policymaking. These include Natural Capital 
Project9 is one of many efforts seeking to transform valuation information based 
on flows of services into capital stock values; the Economics of Ecosystems and 
Biodiversity, or TEEB (Sukhdev et al. 2010), the World Bank’s Global 
Partnership for Wealth Accounting and Valuation of Ecosystem Services or 
WAVES (WAVES Partnership 2016), and the European Environmental Agency’s 
efforts to create a Common International Classification of Ecosystem Services, or 
CICES (European Commission et al. 2013). 
The CICES ecosystem services classification, reflecting general usage, 
designates provisioning, regulating, and cultural service types. Regulating 
services include flood protection and mitigation and markets for such services 
could promote investment in natural infrastructure. 
                                                        
9 www.naturalcapitalproject.org   
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Markets for ecosystem services are a concept that is under active 
development, for example in the Australian State of Victoria (Victorian 
Government 2011). The development of market allocation process for ecosystem 
services has touched on a wide variety of resources, including urban open space 
(Doyle and BenDor 2009), wetlands and watershed protection areas (Bonn et al. 
2014) and agriculture (Ribaudo et al. 2010), but the principles being applied and 
experience gained may be transferred to coastal areas. The discussion above about 
the role of ecosystem services as possibly contributing to coastal protection in the 
face of sea level rise points to one possible way in which markets for ecosystem 
services in coastal areas could evolve.  
Another potential application of market principles in coastal management is 
suggested by the experience transforming command and control regulatory 
approaches to tradable permits. This is an area with a long history and substantial 
experience in a variety of different applications, particularly related to air and 
water quality. A coastal management application of this principle could be 
developed for the allocation of shoreline protection. A tradable permit system 
where the incentives favor the use of less environmentally damaging natural 
infrastructure that maintains or expands ecosystem services such as habitat and 
biodiversity for an equivalent level of regulating services could be shown to be 
superior to regulatory systems that encourage hard armored sea walls where there 
is a net loss of ecosystem services. The structure of the incentives would be 
established, as in a cap and trade system, to reflect the environmental sensitivity 
within a given stretch of coastline (Colgan and Newkirk 2016). 
9. SUMMARY 
There is a growing awareness that the effects of climate change can no longer be 
avoided. Damages to resources, ecosystems, and economies are already occurring, 
but at levels that are likely to be small fractions of what lies ahead, particularly if 
effective reductions of greenhouse gases and mitigation of climate change does 
not occur. Put simply, adaptation to climate change is inevitable. The only 
question whether it is done well or badly, whether adaptation wastes scarce 
resources or makes the best use of what can be done. 
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In this paper, I explore some of the ways in which economic theory and analysis 
can shape our adaptive responses related to effects on coasts and oceans focusing 
on four questions: 
 How can economics help confront the profound uncertainty 
that shapes all decisions regarding climate change? 
 How should adaptation be paid for? 
 What are the socioeconomic values at risk from climate 
change? 
 Can market mechanisms be used to make adaptation more 
efficient? 
9.1 Dealing with Uncertainty 
Climate change’s magnitude and its effects are of such profound scope and such 
unknown dimensions that economists have raised questions about the ability of 
economics to say much that is practical. The debate arose over the issue about 
how much of society’s resources should be diverted into arrangements to 
significantly reduce the amount of greenhouse gases emitted into the atmosphere 
but the same problem carries over into the extent of sea level rise for which 
planning will be undertaken There are a number of integrated climate-economic 
models that present plausible futures, and there are various efforts to convert 
uncertainty (unknown probabilities) into risked (known probabilities) from which 
standard economic models can be constructed. These efforts are helpful to raise 
awareness and to motivate actions, but at the end of the day no one knows how 
much climate will change or sea levels will rise and thus precisely how much 
money to spend to deal with it. The systems are too complex, the time horizons 
too long and the extent to which fundamentally unpredictable human choices will 
shape the future all combine to make economic models that seek to define some 
optimal level of adaptation efforts of little actual use to those who must make 
decisions now about what to do to affect a future thirty or more years into the 
future. 
The evidence from the literature reviewed suggests, however, that there are 
important insights from economics and other fields that can and should be brought 
to bear on adaptation decisions but that these insights must be part of a more 
broadly conceived decision making process.  A sequential, iterative adaptation 
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planning process that utilizes continually updated adaptation plans based on new 
information about options, risks, benefits and costs, allows decisions to be made 
about steps to be addressed at present (such as how new development or major 
rebuilds of existing infrastructure) but leaves until later decisions for which there 
is insufficient information. The key to making this iterative process work is that at 
each decision-making stage, the information needed to shift strategies to more (or 
less) investment in adaptation is always identified and a plan for acquiring that 
information put in place.  
Such an approach is also appropriate to the way in which most adaptation 
decisions will be made, which is at the local or regional level where the effects of 
climate change and sea level rise will be most clearly observed. Most of the 
effects on oceans and coasts from climate change will be highly localized, and it 
is at these local levels that decisions will be needed. Flexible, iterative adaptation 
planning will combine the best economic information, risk assessment processes 
such as Bayesian analysis that are suitable for addressing unprecedented climate 
change issues, and stakeholder processes that build on peoples’ known 
approaches to risk management. They will acknowledge risk aversion, but focus 
on what can be done now, while making clear what information will be needed to 
act in the future. The economic information available, including a sense of where 
the funding will come from, will be focused on providing a sense there is a 
measure of control over the effects of sea level rise. 
When decision making about adaptation can be built around these principles, 
the chances of cost-effective adaptation are increased, but never guaranteed. It is 
not pleasant for economists to contemplate a world devoid of any economic 
model that provides an optimal answer and instead one where messy and 
complicated processes must be continually undertaken.  
9.2 Funding 
The need to think about adaptation to sea level rise is becoming more widely 
acknowledged, but the first question for many local officials is not “what should 
we do”; it is “where will we find the money?” The total amount of resources to be 
devoted to adaptation will be determined in both the public and private sectors. 
But where those resources will come from and how they will be distributed are 
issues about which economics can provide critical insights.  
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The distinction between public goods and private goods helps identify 
multiple ways for accumulating the needed resources to at least begin the adaption 
process. Traditional public expenditures can be combined with incentivized 
private expenditures, financing innovations such as green bonds, purpose-built 
revenue districts, and new approaches to insurance to create a pool of financial 
resources from which funding packages can be custom built for the many 
different circumstances where adaptation is necessary.  
Two innovations in finance are likely to play important roles in adaptation 
funding pool: green bonds and the restructuring of insurance. Green bonds 
combine economic returns to the investors with impacts on social goods. The vast 
majority of this type of financing is currently devoted to climate change 
mitigation (renewable energy, etc.) rather than adaptation, but adaptation’s share 
is likely to grow if measurable performance standards for adaptation project 
become available.  
Catastrophe bonds are drawing new capital into reinsurance, the backup to 
property insurers, which will have the effect of keeping private insurance 
available in the face of the large increases in exposure. That increasing exposure 
also increases the incentives for insurers and reinsurers to invest in adaptation, 
particularly to participate in the financing of projects that reduce flooding and 
inundation risks from sea level rise. But the ability of catastrophe bond issuers to 
participate in funding of adaptation (to translate catastrophe bonds into resilience 
bonds) is uncertain because of the short maturity periods of catastrophe bonds and 
the conflict between minimizing risk through diversification of exposure and 
minimizing risk through structural measures. 
The evolving pool of potential resources suggests a four-part strategy: 
 Use general tax revenues to fund the largest projects with the 
greatest benefits or where no other options are available.  
 Encourage the formation of local financing districts using fees, 
taxes and tax increments, insurance savings, and other funding 
streams flowing from the benefits of reduced flood risks and use 
the revenues to fund versions of green bonds. 
 Funds for disaster responses should always pay for both 
recovery and reduced risks. Every disaster is an opportunity to 
reduce risks and no opportunity should be missed to do so. 
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 Flood insurance, public or private, should be managed and 
priced to encourage risk reducing adaptation actions whenever 
possible. Revised building codes that mandate risk reducing 
adaptation should be funded through reduced insurance cost. 
This list of options is primarily directed at adaptation strategies that involve 
rearranging and reorganizing the built and natural environments so as to minimize 
the effects of flooding and inundation at least for some period. The ultimate 
adaptation strategy of retreat from the shoreline calls for an entirely different set 
of considerations into play. Retreat eliminates the kind of community level 
financing options what may play a major role in protection/rebuilding strategies. 
Insurance proceeds and disaster recovery funds may provide resources for retreat, 
but retreat will rarely be the first or even second preference. There are also many 
locations, such as those in Alaska and Louisiana, where storms and flooding are 
not the threat but a combination of eroding and lands and rising sea levels. For 
these locations, no financing strategy outside of Quadrant I is likely feasible.  
Support for significant retreat will put additional pressure to find ways to use the 
other funding sources so that only unique challenges need draw on general 
funding. 
9.3 Assessing Vulnerability 
A key part of the discussions about climate change, particularly sea level rise, has 
been a proliferation of studies measuring the potential damages to property, both 
private and public. Such studies are now undertaken regularly at different 
geographic scales and they have been extremely useful in raising awareness of the 
dangers of sea level rise. But the pictures that have been painted are incomplete 
and may underestimate the seriousness of the problem. 
Most property damage studies combine estimates of sea level rise and 
resultant flooding with location specific property value data, usually from 
property tax or real estate databases. The result is often estimates of flooding that 
will occur 50 to 100 years hence linked to today’s buildings and property values. 
A similar problem exists when the dependent socioeconomic variables include 
employment, output, vulnerable populations, or other measures: current 
conditions matched against future threats. Seasonal changes in the population and  
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A timing problem also exists with respect to flooding. Floods are temporary; 
water recedes, and recovery begins. The actual future that will unfold will, in 
most cases be cycles of increasing frequency of damages, recovery, and 
rebuilding. These cycles will reshape regional economies in ways not entirely 
predictable but also largely ignored in current studies. 
Economic vulnerability studies need to evolve to incorporate a greater 
measure of dynamics both in terms of the changes possible that will shape 
vulnerability and will reshape it over time through hazard cycles. This is not 
merely a question of estimating vulnerability levels. The economic consequences 
of sea level rise could include a large scale geographic restructuring of local, 
regional, and perhaps national economies. Examining how locational rigidities, 
such as clusters or labor force constraints might accelerate or retard regional 
changes as flooding becomes more frequent needs to be become part of 
vulnerability. Improving estimates of vulnerability is critical not only to improve 
awareness of the risks but also to estimating the benefits from avoided damages 
that are critical to the assessment of adaptation options. 
A similar set of questions about the industrial and geographic nature of 
adaptation in fisheries, where changes in ocean temperatures and chemistry 
(ocean acidification) will significantly alter the distribution and abundance of 
commercially important species. In some places, the fishing industry will adapt by 
shifting between species, as has been the case in response to management 
restrictions. But in other places, particularly those dependent on fish harvesting 
income for a significant portion of their regional income or dependent on single 
species will face more profound economic adaptation challenges. These 
consequences are yet to be examined. 
9.4 Allocating the Coast Using Market Mechanisms 
The final section of the paper considers the use of market mechanisms to help 
adaptation decisions. Market mechanisms are the predominant form of policy 
recommended for reducing greenhouse gas emissions because of their flexibility 
and adaptability to many different situations. This attention on market systems is 
concurrent with the significantly increased attention by economists on the concept 
of ecosystem services, which provides a way to better understand the economic 
values of natural resources and a potential means for markets to function to 
allocate resources. 
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Two market-based approaches are discussed. Markets for ecosystems services 
are being established in places such as Australia. Such markets are likely to help 
preserve critical ecosystems, particularly if their economic value for flood 
protection can be recognized and incorporated into adaptation strategies. Tradable 
permit approaches may also provide needed improvements to the command and 
control regulatory approach to managing the external effects of shoreline 
armoring by better pricing the regulating services of natural infrastructure.  
10. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This overview indicates that economics has a vital role in helping shaping the 
responses of coastal areas to climate change, particularly sea level rise. The broad 
outlines of the theoretical and empirical tasks that must be undertaken by 
economists has been suggested, but the real work lies ahead in translating these 
outlines into specific research. The agenda of that research is far larger than can 
be enumerated here, but there are some cross-cutting themes across the four 
questions that have been explored that may be of some use in guiding future 
efforts. These are: 
1. Developing the data to undertake the benefit cost analyses of 
options for adaptation. 
2. Learning how economic information is best used by decision 
makers and stakeholder processes undertaking adaptation planning. 
3. Examining in detail the options for financing mechanisms that 
permit the beneficiaries of adaptation measures to pay for those 
measures in the most efficient manner. 
4. Exploring options to improve the use of insurance to more 
effectively cover losses and to pay for risk-minimizing actions 
during disaster recovery.  
These can be considered cross cutting areas in several ways. The concept of 
ecosystem services will become more and more important in estimating the 
benefits and costs of adaptation options, and methods to value such services will 
become more important. The “regulating values” of ecosystems as flood 
mitigating natural capital may also become the basis for market based approaches. 
At the same time, most of the benefits to be realized from flood control adaptation 
are the avoided costs of damages. Current studies estimate such benefits from 
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current coastal uses. But such uses may change significantly over the next 50-70 
years. At a minimum, understanding the regional economic dynamics discussed in 
the section on vulnerability assessment will greatly improve the estimates of 
benefits and costs. 
The work by Susskind et al. (2015) demonstrates that stakeholder based 
decision processes can address the complex issues involved in coastal adaptation. 
But this research should be considered in the category of “proof of concept”. 
Much more research needs to be done to help communities learn to assess risks 
with methods such as Bayesian analysis, to conceive of adaptation as a multi-
decadal process, and to accompany decisions to postpone action (which are easy) 
with information maps to guide future decision makers (which will be hard). 
Equally important, the same stakeholder processes, or closely related ones, 
will also be needed to design and implement financing mechanisms based on 
using the benefits of adaptation to fund the actions. Economists need to help sort 
out who pays and who benefits to design such mechanisms, as well as speak to the 
efficiency and equity effects of different approaches such as fees, taxes, tax 
increments, and insurance premium savings. These issues will lie at the heart of 
the difficult choices about community-based funding strategies. 
Finally, there are many issues involved in improving flood insurance, but 
none more important than sorting out the appropriate roles of public and private 
insurance/reinsurance, addressing the stresses of self-insurance for public 
facilities, and finding ways to combine recovery and risk reduction to avoid self-
perpetuating (and self-defeating) cycles of disaster recovery that only returns to 
the status quo. 
11. CONCLUSIONS 
Adapting shorelines and coasts, with their enormous economic values, to the 
coming age of sea level rise presents unprecedented challenges to those who must 
manage the built and natural environments. That a threat exists is well known but 
neither the size nor the timing of that threat is known. The costs are currently 
beyond calculation, but despite all this, actions must be taken if for no other 
reason than commitments are being made today to development and conservation 
of coasts that may be short lived if done in ignorance of sea level rise and other 
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climate change threats. Finding the best solutions in a world of limited resources 
will require the tools of economics, but the tools must be embedded in new 
processes for decisions about the built and natural environments that reflect the 
long term and iterative nature of both threats and response.  
The endpoint of this process is not an optimal adaptation strategy but a series 
of choices based on continually updated and revised information about options, 
risks, costs, and benefits. As such it is more akin to Charles Lindblom’s definition 
of incremental as opposed to rational comprehensive decision making, which he 
called “muddling through”. (Lindblom 1959) This may not appear to be very 
hopeful result to those who seek an optimum adaptation strategy or who seek a 
level of certainty prior to action that will never be available. But muddling 
through is surely a better choice than the dismal theorem.  
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